An interesting green building litigation that was filed last fall last fall in Cook County (Illinois) Circuit Court has flown under the radar. Though details are slim and the only papers I have been able to pull thus far are the complaint, I thought it was worth mentioning here at GRELJ in the context of how ordinary green building projects – as opposed to the maligned Destiny USA mega-development – can still present additional risks for project teams.

The project – profiled here – contemplated the gut renovation of 5354 North Paulina Street in the Andersonville section of Chicago, a 3-story former farmhouse that dates from 1883 (pictured). The owner of the 2200-square-foot house, Laurie Bain, was aiming for a LEED Certified rating from USGBC under LEED for Homes. Vertex’s design earned accolades for its tight building envelope and was touted as “a fantastic example of how LEED can be done affordably.” Total projected construction costs were less than $100 per square foot; the design took advantage of cross-ventilation and other passive energy techniques to avoid the installation of any costly renewable energy systems.

According to the complaint, “the stated objective of the Architectural Contract was to ‘create a sustainable green modern single family home.’” The form agreement the parties used was the B105-2007 (or its predecessor B155-1993), which is the AIA’s standard form of agreement for a residential or small commercial project. (Vertex also served as the general contractor for the project, though there are no specific allegations relating to LEED for Homes certification arising out of the firm’s construction phase services).

The LEED-related allegations are contained in the first cause of action for breach of the architect’s agreement. Bain claims that, among other breaches, the architect “failed to pursue and obtain for the Project certification from the USGBC LEED for Homes Program.” Although the architect’s specific responsibilities under the agreement and its accompanying scope of work are unclear, this allegation is, as far as I can tell, the first to be included in a civil complaint against a design professional (or a contractor) where an owner has alleged breach of contract for failure to pursue and/or obtain LEED certification as required by the contract documents. Note that we will need to wait to review the actual contract language, including the scope of work, before making a more definitive assessment of the parties’ respective obligations and how and what might have gone wrong.

The second cause of action in Vertex is for breach of the construction contract (the AIA’s standard form of agreement between owner and contractor for a residential or small commercial project, the A105-2007, which was also attached as an exhibit). Both causes of action seek damages in excess of $50,000. According to the court’s docket, it appears that the architect has served an answer to the complaint that includes a counterclaim, and the sides are in the middle of exchanging written discovery.

The Cook County Circuit Court docket number for Bain v. Vertex Architects, LLC is 2010-L-012695. We’ll follow up if and when more details about the action become available. Until then, the suit should serve as an important reminder to architects, engineers, contractors, and owners that LEED-related risks are real and must be managed by, among other things, paying careful attention to the scope of work agreed to by contract.

I am pleased to announce that an article I co-authored with Professor Darren Prum of Regis University has been published as the lead feature article in Volume 23, Issue 2 of the Loyola Consumer Law Review. The pinpoint citation is 23 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 113 (2010).

Green Building Contracts: Considering the Roles of Consequential Damages & Limitation of Liability Provisions begins by tracing the development of the legal concept of consequential damages at common law through modern decisions applying those concepts to construction disputes. It proceeds to analyze the competing concerns of construction project participants when negotiating consequential damages and limitation of liability provisions, underscoring those that are particularly salient for green building projects. The article then considers those concerns in the context of pertinent provisions in various AIA, EJCDC, ConsensusDOCS, and Design-Build Institute of America form documents. It concludes by providing a set of recommendations for owners, design professionals, contractors, and consultants to consider when negotiating similar provisions, most of which are relevant for any type of construction project whether green or not.

A copy of the article is available for download here; Professor Prum and I look forward to any feedback in the comments below.

Article 1 of the Exhibit – Project Goals – allows the parties to describe the project’s green building aims with specificity and align their expectations from the beginning; as many insurers have observed, “claims begin with violated expectations.” Article 5 addresses some of the insurance claims which have been reported to date, and includes language that aims to manage the risks that may arise from the use of experimental products, designs, or building systems. (Note that “aggressive design” was one specific risk identified by Marsh in its report last summer about green building-related risks perceived by A/E/C executives).

However, Article 4 – Remedies, is the provision which I think deserves the most attention. It offers the owner and its design-builder a menu of options to choose in the event that the project fails to earn the anticipated level of LEED or other third-party certification, or other green building project goal that may be described elsewhere in the Exhibit. Critically, though, the obligation for determining whether any green building regulatory requirements exist with which the project must comply rests not with the design-builder, but with the owner. More on that in a moment.

With respect to how potential remedies are organized in Article 4, the owner can first expressly agree that a failure is not a breach of contract, and simply waive any claims against the design-builder arising out of the project’s failure “to satisfy or achieve LEED certification at any level or other sustainable standards.” If the owner’s green goals for the project are purely aspirational, this may be a viable request for the design-builder or contractor to make during negotiations. Of course, if third-party or other certification is required by code or other legislation, such a provision will likely be unacceptable to the owner.

Alternatively, the parties can agree to a fixed dollar amount as liquidated damages in the event of a failure. In this provision, the owner also provides the design-builder with a waiver of claims for other related damages, including consequential damages. As we have discussed here at GRELJ previously, this may be problematic for a variety of reasons. From a legal perspective, whether a liquidated damages provision in this context would be considered a penalty rather than a legitimate estimate of the damages the owner would stand to incur is still a question mark. It will likely be a significant period of time before we have a court opinion weighing on this critical issue.

Finally, the Exhibit includes what I believe to be the most interesting approach to allocating risk in Section 4.3. There, the parties can choose to impose a limited obligation to cure the project’s failure on the design-builder. This obligation is “to cure the situation through the addition, replacement or correction of materials, configurations, systems or equipments in order to obtain the level of LEED certification indicated above and/or to satisfy or achieve other sustainable standards as are identified, or as required by the Legal Requirements [defined in Article 3 of the Exhibit].”

However, the extent of the curing costs for which the design-builder will be responsible is limited to: (i) any remaining funds in the construction contingency (typically a percentage of the overall cost of the work that exists to cover unanticipated construction expenses, which requires the builder to obtain the owner’s prior written approval before accessing it); (ii) the design-builder’s share in the savings if the cost of the work comes in less than the design-builder’s guaranteed maximum price of the work; or (iii) a fixed sum agreed to by the parties.

What is also important to note about the Exhibit is that it places the obligation for determining the Legal Requirements (again, as defined in Article 3) squarely on the shoulders of the owner. In other words, the party which is generally in the least adequate position to determine what those legal requirements might be is actually responsible for them by contract. This makes little sense, and I cannot imagine an owner agreeing to carry that burden, particularly in the current regulatory climate which is changing so rapidly and varies so widely depending on the particular jurisdiction. It seems like an odd approach, and I am curious if anyone has any insight or feedback as to why DBIA crafted Article 3 in this manner.

The entire Exhibit is certainly worth reviewing in detail, but one other provision that I want to draw your particular attention to is Section 6.2, which states clearly that “[i]n no event shall the dates of Substantial Completion and Final Completion be contingent on any certification of the Project to meet any level of the USGBC’s LEED rating system or other similar system.” This is critical, particularly where project schedules are tight and other penalties – liquidated or otherwise – may begin accruing if substantial completion is not reached as required.

One other final thought – it’s also interesting to me that the first green building contract addendum – the AIA’s B214-2004 – purely addressed scope when it debuted three years ago. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations with form contracts and exhibits, and the fact that scope documents such as the B214 do remain useful tools for project teams, the industry clearly perceives risks arising out of green building projects. I anticipate that we will see more organizations developing and promoting similar consensus documents with risk management provisions as we continue to move forward in 2010.

The Addendum also creates a new role for design professionals, contractors, or consultants: the Green Building Facilitator, responsible under the terms of the Addendum for coordinating and facilitating the process of obtaining the owner’s desired green building status or certification, identifying green building measures (both procedural and physical), potential design and construction alternatives, and other services as required by the terms of the Addendum. The Green Building Facilitator is identified explicitly in Section 4 of the Addendum and can be the architect, engineer, contractor, or other corporate entity (or individual). However, the Addendum places certain risks on the Facilitator, and parties that choose to accept this role pursuant to the Addendum should review its terms and conditions carefully.

What’s most interesting for purposes of this article, though, is that Article 8 of the Addendum is devoted exclusively to risk allocation. Article 8.2 provides that the parties- including the Green Building Facilitator- will be subject to any limitations on liability that are included in their underlying contracts. However, this provision explicitly acknowledges that the owner’s “loss of income or profit or inability to realize potential reductions in operating, maintenance, or other related costs, tax, or other similar benefits or credits, marketing opportunities and other similar opportunities or benefits, resulting from a failure to attain the [project’s green building goals as defined in the Addendum] shall be deemed consequential damages subject to any applicable waiver of consequential damages” in any underlying design or construction contract. Compare this provision to the discussion which arose out of the Shaw Development litigation, where many commentators wondered what types of damages flowing from the breach of a green building contract would be deemed consequential in nature rather than direct. It’s therefore particularly noteworthy that the Addendum (i) acknowledges the types of unique damages that may flow from the breach of a green construction contract; and (ii) actually makes an initial effort at defining them. Of course, parties are free to negotiate the terms of the Addendum, including (depending on the project’s scope) (i) the types of damages which would be included in the provision; and (ii) any waivers – mutual or otherwise – in the underlying agreement. In Shaw, as you will recall, the issue was whether the lost tax credits were consequential and therefore waived by the owner through the A201′s mutual waiver provision; under the form terms of the Addendum, they would have been explicitly categorized as consequential. Had the parties in Shaw implemented a document like the Addendum, it would have assisted them in more comprehensively assessing the green building-related risk associated with the project and allocating that risk accordingly.

The Addendum also makes it clear that no project participant other than the Green Building Facilitator will be “liable or responsible for the failure of [any procedural or physical green measures] to achieve the [project’s green building goals as defined in the Addendum],” including the project’s failure to earn any third-party certification as designated in the Addendum. However, the Addendum also makes clear that these limitations on the project team’s liability do not relieve them “from any obligation to perform or provide [procedural or physical green measures]” as required by their underlying contracts. It will be interesting to see if additional form green building contracts and/or addenda are issued in 2010, whether they take these types of risks and limitations on liability into account, and, if so, in what particular fashion.

As you may know, ConsensusDOCS was founded in 2007 and, to date, its suite of form design and construction agreements has been endorsed by 23 different A/E/C organizations. You can download a copy of the Addendum via the link below. As always, the Arent Fox Green Building & Sustainability and Construction Practice Groups are happy to assist you with any additional questions you might have about either the Addendum or working with construction contracts generally.

• 310 Green Building Addendum (ConsensusDOCS)
• New Document Defines Role in Green Building Projects (Arch. Record)

The USGBC August 25, 2009 press release about their Building Performance Initiative implies that a large-scale collection of energy data from LEED® buildings will improve energy performance. This suggests a response to escalating criticism about the actual energy use of LEED® certified buildings compared with all others. Why do few published stories about these buildings include metered energy and water use data? If these buildings can waste energy efficiently, perhaps one answer is not to include those measures that allow that to happen.

The reality is that neither predicted nor actual measured energy use determines whether a building is energy efficient. Nor does energy use alone determine whether a building meets or exceeds all required or desired criteria, or provide the accountability necessary to achieve those results.

I have been collecting and evaluating detailed metered and measured building energy performance data for 40 years. Collecting the data is one thing, even if done completely and correctly. However, evaluating the data and then making comparisons among buildings is something else. Buildings alone do not use energy. The occupants, operators, and systems do.

In an extreme case, look at apartment buildings where each apartment is identical, and the metered energy use per apartment can easily vary by 2 or 3 to one, or more. Individually metered floors in office buildings occupied by the same company or tenant also can vary by 2 or 3 to one.

The functions in a building can also have a major influence on building energy use. The presence of a laundry in a hotel or hospital can make a 25 to 50% difference in total building energy use per bed, room, or square foot compared with an identical building on the same street.

Buildings with intermittent occupancy present similar dilemmas. How does one estimate, predict, or compare the energy data for two identical churches on the same block built at the same time, when one is only occupied for a few hours each Sunday and on some holidays, and the other is occupied most days of the week?

Comparing metered energy use to modeled energy data is not a valid measurement of anything. If the modeling and estimating methods were sufficiently accurate, utility companies would not require the use of meters.

Some articles I wrote 25 years ago show apartment by apartment or office floor by office floor metered energy use data in the same building. For another good example, look at the range of energy data for any given building type shown in the statistically significant quadrennial CBECS reports, collected at a cost in eight figures.

That reminds me of an energy research project 35 years ago during the 1970’s energy crisis. The US Postal Service spent hundreds of thousand of dollars instrumenting and recording the detailed energy use in a large postal facility. The conclusion was that they could collect lots of data.

The answer in evaluating and comparing energy data is using professional judgment and experience. That involves knowing and understanding not only the energy use and particulars of the subject building, but also the energy use and particulars of comparable buildings in the area. Comparing the energy use of a suburban office building in Boston with suburban office buildings in Providence without knowing the particulars is not likely to be meaningful or conclusive. This is much like the commercial real estate appraisal profession.

I think that there are a few important things to consider here. First, in USGBC’s Building Performance Initiative press release, LEED Senior Vice President Scot Horst notes that “[p]lenty of people are content to simply point to these longstanding issues [relating to LEED building performance] without offering a constructive way to address them. We’re going to take them on and engage practitioners and thought leaders alike in establishing a national roadmap to optimize building performance.”

After last fall’s Greenbuild, I suggested over at gbNYC that, if USGBC was serious about improving the energy performance of LEED buildings, it needed to engage building scientists such as Henry Gifford, Joseph Lstiburek, and Mr. Spielvogel in a meaningful way- certainly through more of an effort than simply collecting more data. As Mr. Spielvogel notes in his letter above, “[b]uildings alone do not use energy. The occupants, operators, and systems do.” This, of course, is what makes the type of predictive energy modeling on which LEED relies so imprecise and why project teams need to remain careful about the types of representations they make to their clients about the performance-related results of potential LEED certification. As Pat Murphy noted in a recent comment here at GRELJ, “[t]here is a crying need for accurate, verifiable and reliable energy rating systems. If LEED doesn’t fill the bill, other options will come forward.” I agree with Mr. Murphy and, in conclusion, would suggest that this is precisely what should give policymakers pause as they consider incorporating LEED- as currently constituted- into state- or local-level green building legislation.

• The Ugly, the Bad, & the Good: Thoughts on Greenbuild 2008 (gbNYC)
• Some Buildings Not Living Up to Green Label (NYT)
• Building Performance Initiative (USGBC Press Release)

In this first piece, Mr. Murphy concludes that “[t]here has been concern with the LEED rating system relative to energy and CO2 since its inception. . . . LEED has failed to lead in the important areas that are measurable. Initially, [USGBC] adopted a weak status relative to energy consumption. [It] did not recognize and incorporate accountability and verification, unfortunately wasting years that could have providing important feedback relative to energy use. [It] has also not clearly and honestly communicated that LEED is not an exemplary indication of energy performance.” This final thought, of course, is of particular note in the context of many green building legal issues and why Mr. Murphy’s piece will likely serve as a critical backdrop to associated risk management strategies for stakeholders moving forward.

I encourage you to print off this first article, review it, and share your thoughts below in the comments; we’ll be adding the entire series to our Resources section here at GRELJ once it’s available.

• LEEDing From Behind (Community Solutions)

The much more practical research that I turned up was the following except from an article by Kelly Luckett, the self-proclaimed “Green Roof Guy” who writes a column for greenroofs.com. In a column from the very end of 2008, Mr. Luckett describes how uneducated project teams may unwittingly expose themselves to unanticipated risks stemming from the maintenance requirements of green roof installations. His remarks also reflect a number of key points we’ve made consistently both here at GRELJ and over at gbNYC with respect to the additional risk management strategies demanded by new green building technologies and third-party certification programs.

It is also interesting to note that, for the particular project that he describes below, LEED certification requirements resulted in the green roof’s irrigation system being disconnected after the initial green roof establishment period, which resulted in a roof that did not appear as anticipated by the owner. One last important thought- Mr. Luckett hints that this project was located in Toronto, which, as you’ll recall, recently passed a green roof mandate. I think this is a great example of how legislation is fueling the types of liabilities that we grapple with here at GRELJ, and why, as always, contract language will remain paramount for green building project teams.

I would like to turn the focus now to an issue that continues to plague the green roof industry: the maintenance-free green roof myth.  Some in the media continue to espouse this nonexistent characteristic of green roofs resulting in many of our customers being painfully uneducated about realities of critical green roof maintenance!

Pretty strong language, I know, but the problem doesn’t seem to be getting better.  Let me tell you a story about my company’s largest project.  It’s a government owned project in the city that has become the nation’s green roof capitol; you know the place.  I sat in on a meeting where the general contractor, the architect, and the roofing contractor removed all mention of maintenance guidelines and the Plant Health Alert System from my submittal package!

For those of you outside the construction industry, a submittal package is a gathering of documents and drawings the subcontractor submits to the architect and owner to demonstrate compliance with the specifications for products or portions of the construction project.  When I questioned why they were removing critical pages of information from my submittals, I was told that they eliminated the irrigation system for this 96,000 square foot green roof based on a tour a green roof provider took the owner on during the preceding spring.  I asked if they had told them about the drought that killed green roof plants all over the region the summer before, to which I only received blank stares.  I practically had to threaten to hold my breath until I turned blue, or at least threaten to walk away from the project to get them to issue a change order to put the irrigation system back in.

The green roof was planted in June and July, 2007, and required routine irrigation throughout the establishment period, a task that could not be accomplished over 96,000 square feet using a garden hose.  After alleviating concerns over the irrigation system conflicting with LEED certification requirements by agreeing to disconnect the system after the establishment period, the change order was issued.  However, I insisted that the irrigation system remain in place as insurance should drought conditions require its activation to keep the $250,000 worth of plants alive.

Now fast forward two years. The phone rings; it’s the roofing contractor.  The ownership is requesting a walkthrough to discuss the condition of the green roof.  I asked our horticulturist to accompany me to the autumn meeting on the rooftop. We were greeted by the general contractor, the architect, the roofing contractor, and a clearly unhappy owner’s representative.  The condition of the green roof?  Starving sedums due to absence of the fertilizer that was supposed to have been applied the previous spring, per the maintenance guidelines that the ownership never got to see.

Also, since the plants did not receive the food required to grow and cover the surface of the growth media, the weeds moved in.  The good news –  the weeds will die over the winter and an application of fertilizer next spring will allow the plants to thrive.  The bad news – the project lost the opportunity for the plants to grow in one of the wettest growing seasons on record.  As you can imagine, there was a round of discussion about who was supposed to have provided the maintenance, a discussion that may wind up being continued in a court room.

However, the owner’s representative asked why the irrigation system was still there.  When the general contractor started to speak he was stopped by the owner’s representative who said the question was directed to me.  Before I could answer, another question was posed, “Do you tell your customers that they need to provide irrigation for their green roof?”  To which I replied, “Absolutely yes, every single one of them.”

The owner’s representative, clearly not expecting this answer, became even more agitated.  That’s when I began to appreciate how serious this problem has gotten for the green roof industry.  The owner’s representative placed in charge of one the city’s largest green roofs, in arguably the most green roof educated city in the nation, was utterly surprised by the fact that plants need food and water.  The building code issue evoked an urgent call to arms that brought about action by many and opened lines of communication among perceived adversaries, while lack of proper green roof maintenance poses far more serious threat to the green roof concept yet the green roof industry remains largely quiet.

Admittedly, nobody uses discussing maintenance during the green roof sale as their go-to closing strategy, but it’s a lot healthier for a green roof business in the long run to address this issue upfront rather than standing in the middle of a problem on a green roof facing an unhappy and uneducated customer the following season.  I’ll keep working on the code issues on behalf of the industry, but it’s time the industry start working on this much larger problem.

• The Green Roof Guy (greenroofs.com)
• Green Roof Archive (GRELJ)

Green building design, construction and operation practices have gained widespread popularity in the healthcare industry in recent years, even considering the current challenging economic climate. This trend is likely to continue because green building practices result in both decreased overall life cycle costs and healthier building occupants. This article will briefly examine the background of building green in the healthcare sector, discuss the unique needs of healthcare facilities in relation to green building practices, and finally examine the choices and challenges faced by healthcare facilities in determining whether to design, construct and/or operate a green building facility, with a specific emphasis on the legal issues therein.

Introduction

According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), green building is the practice of creating healthier and more resource-efficient models of construction, renovation, operation, maintenance and demolition. The leading vehicles for green building implementation in the healthcare industry are the Green Guide for Healthcare (“GGHC”), a healthcare industry driven system that was created by the American Society for Healthcare Engineering in 2002 and the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) rating system administered by the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC).

Adapting Green Building to the Unique Needs of Healthcare Facilities

There are a number of unique challenges in accomplishing standard green building practices in healthcare facilities, including, among others:

• The need for hospitals and other healthcare facilities to be open with all systems functioning 24/7;
• The high level of dangerous waste produced by healthcare facilities;
• Patients’ increased sensitivities to chemicals and pollutants (along with related air circulation issues);
• The need for healthcare facilities to meet stringent regulatory standards which are not applicable to typical commercial developments; and
• The fact that healthcare facilities have different transportation expectations than some other places of business (e.g. very few patients can be expected to ride bicycles to the hospital).

As a result of these differences, green building standards for the healthcare industry have taken longer to develop than other uses. Until recently, the healthcare industry generally relied on GGHC in designing, constructing and operating a green building. The GGHC is a voluntary self-certifying program that borrows from, but is not formally connected to the LEED rating system. In a manner similar to the LEED system, GGHC gives a certain number of “credits” for each environmentally-friendly and energy-efficient characteristic incorporated into a building. GGHC includes metrics for both construction and operations, which allows it to be used for existing facilities as well as new construction. Because GGHC is a self-certifying system, healthcare entities who wish to use it must vouch for their own compliance with the program.

The USGBC’s LEED system is the most established green building rating system. It is also a third-party certification system, so in contrast to GGHC, it more rigorously scrutinizes a project’s green building features. Some healthcare facilities have elected to invest the extra time, money, and effort required for LEED certification. For example, the Dell Children’s Medical Center (“DCMC”) in Austin, Texas is one of the most dynamic green building healthcare facilities, as evidenced by recently becoming the world’s first LEED Platinum-certified hospital. DCMC has succeeded in accomplishing some amazing results, including, an onsite natural gas power plant providing 100% of the facility’s electricity; recycling 75% of the waste produced during construction; and ensuring that no location in the building is ever more than 32 feet away from a source of sunlight. Various challenges, such as the hospital’s 24/7 operation schedule, required DCMC to overcompensate in other areas in order to reach Platinum certification. The project’s architect admits that the challenges in obtaining certification under a system not designed for healthcare were “enormous,” but apparently worth the cost for the hospital, which predicts that its energy efficiency investments will pay for themselves within six years. There are currently less than 40 other LEED-certified healthcare facilities of any type across the country (including, for example, the
Boulder Community Hospital in Boulder, Colorado, which was the first-ever hospital to be LEED-certified, and the Jewish Hospital Medical Center South in the Louisville, Kentucky area). However, approximately 350 hospitals that are currently under construction are LEED-registered, indicating a desire to achieve LEED certification upon completion. Luckily, for those looking for something more rigorous than the GGHC, but more tailored to healthcare than general LEED certification, the USGBC will soon issue a new LEED for Healthcarerating system. The new certification system will incorporate feedback from pilot projects that used GGHC and will be open to a public comment period before being officially implemented.

Choices and Challenges

Those who are beginning the planning process for green healthcare facilities have three possible paths to choose from at this point: they can wait until LEED for Healthcare is rolled out, use traditional LEED, or use GGHC. All of these choices have positives and negatives: LEED for Healthcare will likely become the new industry standard, but its exact requirements are not yet clear, so healthcare entities might have to delay their projects or could be taking a risk by committing themselves to a program under which they may not be able to obtain certification. Traditional LEED is rigorous and well-recognized, but could impose unnecessary costs and difficulties when applied to the healthcare sector. GGHC has clear metrics that are already tailored to healthcare construction and operations, but does not carry the same weight as LEED since it is a voluntary, self-certifying system.

There are certain actions, no matter what green building rating system decision makers elect to utilize, that healthcare facility decision makers must take in order to limit unforeseen cost, risk and liability. It is important to make green building goals clear and specific early in the planning process. A team of experienced professionals, including architects, construction managers, contractors, lawyers and others, with quantifiable experience on past GGHC or LEED-certified projects is also highly recommended. These experts will be able to properly guide property owners with the unique issues that arise in connection with green building and thus help mitigate further risk.

There are multiple legal risks that green healthcare facility project teams should consider, some of which may include:

• Whether there any potential governmental incentives or other awards that might help supplement the costs of green construction;
• The proper detailing of liability for failure to achieve certain green standards;
• The evolution of labor laws regarding the classification of the construction tasks for new green building work, such as green roofs;
• Lease drafting that requires all tenants at the property satisfy certain green building operational requirements; and
• Avoidance of greenwashing, or misleading the environmental benefits of the facility or services being provided.

There are innumerable other legal issues associated with green building and leasing. As this is an emerging area, it is important to work with professionals in order to avoid unnecessary liabilities when implementing green design features or pursuing any form of third-party certification.

Conclusion

Green building design, construction and operation practices are likely to continue at an exponential growth pattern in the healthcare industry in the years ahead. It is critical for facility owners, managers and stakeholders to fully understand the unique issues that arise for green building in the healthcare arena and work with a team of professionals that can help advise and minimize the risks associated therewith.

There are two key questions for owners and design professionals to consider in connection with standard of care provisions in construction agreements: (1) has the design professional agreed to perform at a higher standard of care than that which prevails in the industry? and (2) has the design professional provided the equivalent of a warranty or guarantee to the owner with respect to the services that it will render? Language that obligates the design professional to satisfy “the highest standards of the profession” or “the standards of similar firms with extensive green design expertise” is ambiguous and may allow an insurance carrier to argue that the design professional agreed to perform with a higher level of care for which insurance coverage may be unavailable. This is because most professional liability insurance policies contain an exclusion for assumptions of liability that are not imposed by law (i.e., by agreeing to perform at a higher level than the prevailing common law standard, the design professional will not be covered for any resulting claims of negligent design services). Such language may also be construed by a court to be the functional equivalent of a warranty or guarantee in the event of a dispute; as set forth below, most professional liability policies exclude coverage for these types of claims as well.

Performance-based (i.e., “this design will achieve a LEED Gold rating” or “will reduce operating costs by 50 percent”) language in a standard of care provision may also be problematic if the insurer believes that the design professional has provided the owner with the equivalent of a warranty or guarantee. For example, in a case out of the Eighth Circuit, an engineer agreed to provide an owner with “[t]he necessary engineering plant layout and equipment design and the on-site engineering supervision and start up engineering services necessary for the construction of a hully by-product facility capable of reducing a minimum of 7.5 tons of rice hulls per hour to an ash and producing a minimum of 48 million BTUs per hour of steam at 200 pounds pressure.” Arkansas Rice Growers Co-op Ass’n v. Alchemy Indus. Inc., 797 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1986). The plant never operated as intended, and the owner sued the engineer. The court expressly held that the design professional had “warranted that a plant constructed according to the design was capable of achieving the performance criteria” and noted that “[t]he evidence is undisputed that the plant was never capable of achieving the performance criteria on a sustained basis.” Professional liability policies generally exclude coverage for claims arising out of the breach of a warranty or guarantee. Both owners and design professionals should thus review language in their construction agreements for provisions that could potentially be construed by an insurer as the equivalent of a warranty or guarantee, particularly with respect to the project achieving a certain level of LEED or other third-party certification.

It is also important to note that the form standard of care language in the AIA’s B101 Owner – Architect Agreement (2007), which is found in Section 2.2, states that “[t]he Architect shall perform its services consistent with the professional skill and care ordinarily provided by architects practicing in the same or similar locality under the same or similar circumstances. The Architect shall perform its services as expeditiously as is consistent with such professional skill and care and the orderly progress of the Project.” This language mirrors the common law standard of care which a professional liability policy will insure against. However, exactly what constitutes the “professional skill and care ordinarily provided by architects (or engineers, as the case may be) practicing in the same or similar locality under the same or similar circumstances” is a much thornier question; this standard is, by nature, not objective but subjective; it changes periodically based on the prevailing level of competency of other similarly-situated professionals in the same geographic region.

Although professional liability insurance will track the prevailing standard of care, as we noted previously in an article over at gbNYC, and as attorney/architect Fred Butters discusses extensively in his article in Understanding the Business of Green, there is no question that LEED and green building practices generally are shifting the standard of care for design professionals to a higher level. For example, new obligations in the 2007 version of the AIA documents and Canon of Ethics require the architect to recommend sustainable design alternatives to the owner. Moreover, the proliferation of the LEED AP and other representations that many architects and engineers are making throughout the industry with respect to their sustainable design expertise is increasing the expectation that such design professionals will deliver a design that performs at a higher level than in the past. The danger here is for design professionals who are not sufficiently well-versed in green design; if the standard of care has increased, are such design professionals failing to satisfy the prevailing standard of care and thus exposing themselves to claims for negligent design work? This is not an insurance coverage question, but nevertheless an important consideration for both construction attorneys and insurance professionals to monitor closely in the months ahead.

Owners and design professionals must consider the foregoing standard of care considerations in connection with green building projects and should discuss the professional liability insurance coverage implications of such provisions with their insurance carriers if they have yet to do so already. A more general discussion of whether certain representations in standard of care provisions will be deemed by the carrier as raising the standard of care beyond the prevailing common law standard is also advisable. Regardless, it is critical for design professionals to keep in mind that because the standard of care is a moving target, paying careful attention to the language in such provisions during the course of construction contract negotiations for a green building project is imperative.

Specifically, while the new Stadium was projected to more or less play the same as the old one across the street, a number of factors that the Yankees and their design team may not have considered, underestimated, or were outside of their control all along have resulted in a drastically different performance than the club anticipated. For example, the new Stadium stands sixty feet taller and concourses on each level of seating are exposed to the building’s exterior, which may be creating a wind tunnel effect that is blowing baseballs out towards the fences. Interestingly, the Yankees and their engineers are not entirely certain about what will happen to these wind patterns once the old Stadium is razed as demolition has yet to start in earnest.

The analogy here, of course, is where policymakers, owners, or other stakeholders make legislative or project-related choices that are based on projections which do not accurately reflect actual performance once a structure is brought online; these dangers are even more acute where contract documents obligate a project team to achieve a certain level of performance or fixed reduction in operating expenses that are based on a predictive model. The reasons why a building’s performance could diverge may be complex and entirely unanticipated by stakeholders; building science is complicated and buildings themselves are complex systems for which modeling does not always reflect reality. The experience at New Yankee Stadium to date may be a rather simplistic example, but I do think it helps make the point that predicting performance and evaluating performance based on actual data are two very different ballgames.

The paper is essentially divided into five sections: (1) general points about whether risk exists for real estate stakeholders in connection with green building projects; (2) a brief overview of some emerging regulatory concerns; (3) whether increasing concerns about achieving LEED certification are valid; (4) a discussion of new products and technologies as risk concerns; and (5) how knowledge, experience, and contracts can help green building project stakeholders mitigate green building risk. The paper unquestionably provides a good legal primer with respect to each of these issues but injects a tone of commentary into the discussion that unnecessarily trivializes many of the legal issues that the green construction bar continues to grapple with. For example, the paper starts out by stating that “[a]ccording to insurance professionals . . . there have been very few claims reported arising out of sustainable design to date, despite concerns to the contrary. The risks to architects in ‘building green’ are essentially the same as the risks on other projects.” Standard of care and insurance coverage issues, for example, have many design professionals, their insurers, and even owners concerned about the availability of coverage in event of a claim that arises out of disputed green design services. While general principles of construction law will always apply to every project, calling their application in novel contexts to be simply “old bottles” suggests that there is no additional risk for project teams to consider or attorneys to address in contract documents.

One specific point made in the paper that’s also worth noting relates to the factual posture of the Shaw Development case. The paper incorrectly states that Maryland’s green building tax credit program which was at issue in the lawsuit was “limited to qualifying LEED projects and restricted to a set window of time. The project did not have LEED qualification within the window of time and Shaw sued for damages for the loss of the tax credits.” As you’ll recall, the issue in Shaw was the parties’ failure to understand the applicable tax credit program, which required a certificate of occupancy by a certain fixed date in order for a LEED-hopeful project to take advantage of tax credits; formal LEED certification was not required. Shaw emphasizes that legislative schemes are among the fundamental drivers of green building risk and must be clearly understood and accurately reflected by controlling contract documents.

Additionally, on page 5, the paper states that “[w]hile some commentators recommend avoiding guarantees, a precise contract can appropriately define the guarantee and mitigate risk.” However, there is no detailed discussion of exactly how stakeholders might begin to craft such provisions. More critically, the paper fails to discuss why even the appearance of the equivalent of a warranty or a guarantee or an elevated standard of care may be problematic from the perspective of a professional liability policy (i.e., these are form exclusions to the standard policy which most architects and engineers are required to procure on every project by contract). The Marsh end-of-year report from 2008 makes it clear that professional liability insurers are keenly monitoring this area of activity with heightened scrutiny. While standard exclusions to a professional liability policy are indeed traditional components of construction law, it is also clear that the rapidly moving standard of care for design professionals is unprecedented, and its implications should not be understated by attorneys who represent architects and engineers.

I want to emphasize that I am not criticizing USGBC’s effort to foster discussion about these important issues; rather, I think it’s extremely positive that the organization has taken this initial step towards engaging the legal industry in refining the parameters of green building risk management. As I noted last November over at gbNYC, this was a major shortcoming at last year’s Greenbuild and it’s encouraging that USGBC has started to move in a different direction. However, I think it is troubling that the paper chose to characterize green building law as “new wine in old bottles.” In my opinion, the reasons why many of the issues noted in the paper are creating a new paradigm meriting the attention of both legal scholars and practitioners are four-pronged: regulatory activity at the federal, state, and local levels is moving more rapidly than anyone can track in sufficient detail; the insurance coverage implications for claims arising out of green design have been largely unremarked upon; the insurance industry itself has acknowledged that the standard of care for design professionals is changing more quickly than at any time in history thanks to the proliferation of the LEED AP and green design obligations in the new AIA construction documents; and preliminary data suggesting that green buildings may not perform at the higher level generally anticipated by most project teams may have significant consequences both in terms of litigation and future policymaking. These are a set of completely new and emerging legal issues that will have a major impact on how attorneys create risk management strategies for their clients as green construction practices continue to proliferate. Suggesting otherwise will likely damage the long-term prospects of the green building movement, particularly if it encourages stakeholders not to take these emerging risks seriously and engage counsel capable of assisting them in navigating unchartered waters.

The paper is a quick read and I hope you will print it, review it, and share your thoughts in the comments below.

• The Legal Risk in Building Green (USGBC)

Lest anyone suggest that these not practical concerns for every green construction project, I’ve compiled a series of images below of project sites here in Manhattan at various stages of completion over the course of the past six months. From left to right, I think the images speak for themselves; the first project, though pre-certified at the time under the LEED for Core and Shell system, had not formally received a LEED Gold rating from USGBC as the sidewalk bridging suggested. The second, which is currently plastered over construction fencing that covers future ground floor retail space at what will be a LEED Gold retrofit in Midtown, simply states that the space is “green” without any detail regarding exactly what “green” means. Finally, I think the third photograph demonstrates a partial best practice for green building owners: be straightforward about the project and what is attempting to accomplish – “pursuing LEED Gold certification”- without making exaggerated claims or guarantees about final certification level or how the building will perform down the line.

As Kim Ford of CresaPartners notes in the CoStar piece, “[o]ften, the people marketing LEED-registered buildings like to use the word LEED, but they’re very naive about the terminology.” Anderson also makes the excellent point that “[w]hen it’s a statement of environmental good, there’s a presumption that it might not need to be examined carefully.” Beyond terminology, Mr. Burr points out that, according to a recent study by Green World Media, between 25 and 30 percent of LEED-registered projects drop out of the process and never proceed to final certification, in part due to the expense, but also the average two-year lag between registration and formal certification. For the owner that sticks “LEED Gold Certified” on project marketing materials, in quarterly reports or other disclosures to the SEC, or in a lease term sheet with a tenant who has a corporate mandate to occupy office space in LEED Gold buildings only, the potential liability for a LEED-registered project that drops out of USGBC’s queue could be enormous.

One of the major reasons why I launched this site was to foster a “more robust,” as I called it, discussion of the liability aspects of building green amongst industry stakeholders and, again, I’m happy to see CoStar presenting some of these issues so early on in 2009. Nevertheless, I do think these issues are real and serious for every owner to consider, particularly in the type of down economy where litigation is always more pervasive.

• Increase in Dubious Claims of LEED Certification Seen in Marketplace (CoStar)

• Top 5 Legal Issues to Consider on Green Construction Projects (gbNYC)
• Green Building Liability (gbNYC category)
• Contract Language Remains Key (gbNYC)
• Need for Green Counsel as Claims Brought Against Designers (gbNYC)

• West Coast Green Panel Discusses Risk Management for Green Building Projects (gbNYC)
• Minimizing Green Building Risks (Greener Buildings)
• Listening to Greenbuild (Green Building Law Blog)