First, with respect to building performance, the report notes that “[t]here is very limited data that correlates verifiable improvements in building performance with building rating/certification system requirements. Many people view the few data sets that do exist as controversial in terms of methodologies and conclusions drawn from them.” It also observes that “[t]here are growing concerns that the implied guarantee of building energy performance emanating from building rating/certification/labeling systems may confuse or mislead policy makers and the public.” The controversial USGBC-backed New Buildings Institute study- whose conclusions continue to be cited in support of LEED building performance claims- could certainly be the partial genesis of these remarks.

In terms of green building legislation, the report also emphasizes a number of important points, noting that “[e]lected officials and policy makers at the federal, state, and local levels only rarely understand the objectives, development, intended uses, opportunities, and limitations of rating/certification programs for buildings and accreditation programs for individuals.” Moreover, the report argues that “[a]t an increasing rate, state and local governments and their code/regulatory agencies are adopting building rating / certification systems, intended as voluntary systems, to be their code or regulatory requirements, often without fully understanding their benefits, tradeoffs, and costs.” These remarks comport with the notion that many state and local governments have rushed to legislate in knee-jerk fashion, failing to analyze or review  corresponding legal implications; the AHRI v. City of Albuquerque litigation, for example, is illustrative here.

Perhaps most significantly, the report levels a heavy-handed critique at the organizations which promulgate green building rating systems, stating that “[m]any of the building rating/certification systems and individual accreditation systems appear to place the goal of generating revenue for their development organization as a goal equal to the organization’s commitment to knowledge development and advocacy around its issue,” and that such systems “appear to certify expertise in applying the program more than improving the actual building’s performance.” With respect to that expertise, the report acknowledges “a growing concern that individual accreditation programs are not based on rigorous criteria and testing that validate competence.” Note here that no single system was identified in the body of the report, though I’m curious whether these remarks will elicit any response from USGBC or other organizations.

In terms of legal risks arising out of green building projects, the “Owner Expectations and Professional Liability” section of the report acknowledges many of the types of risks which have been discussed here and elsewhere over the past year. For example, the Task Group notes that “design and contractor liability risk may rise if performance expectations are not realized in completed projects” and that rating systems and accreditation programs “are beginning to impact the professional standard of care recognized by law and the building community. Such systems and programs may cause design professionals, owners, managers, and facilities personnel to be held to higher degrees of expertise and performance.”

A shifting standard of care being fueled by green building practices is a critical issue that we have discussed frequently at GRELJ, and it’s important for design professionals to note that NIBS specifically identified it in the report. The Task Group also discusses green building insurance claims, noting that “[t]he vast majority of insurance claims involve misrepresentation, miscommunication, and misunderstood expectations between owners and design and construction professionals.” This remark reminded me of a BIM/green building panel held here in New York City nearly two years ago where a number of insurance industry professionals warned that claims- in the green building space or otherwise- always start with violated expectations.

The Task Group concludes the report with a set of recommendations to NIBS moving forward, which include encouraging the A/E/C community to “support one comprehensive, consensus-based building rating or certification or labeling program to reduce the complexities and contradictions that currently exist” and the development of various white papers that analyze the foregoing points in greater detail. As you may know, NIBS is a non-profit organization that was founded in 1974 by act of Congress; 6 of the 21 members of its Board of Directors are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. Given NIBS’ backing and the scope of the Task Group’s conclusions and recommendations to the Board, its release of this report could mark the beginning of a serious uptick in the level of analysis being performed in this area.

You can download the report through the link below. I look forward to your thoughts and reactions in the comments.

• Report on Building Rating & Certification in the U.S. Building Community (NIBS)

Although the study concluded that these 19 green buildings were consuming (on average) 40 percent more energy than predicted, all of the buildings were consuming less than a building designed to Massachusetts baseline building codes. The disparity in predicted versus actual energy consumption is probably not surprising, but the study did identify a number of issues common across the buildings which resonate with many of the technical and operational provisions of documents like the Model Green Lease. I think it is therefore worthwhile to review the study both from a green leasing perspective, but also in terms of LEED, particularly because the Lowell study has not been referenced in many of the recent articles discussing the ongoing LEED performance gap.

Among other factors, the study identified the following as accounting for the disparity in predicted versus actual performance:

• The predictive energy models used during the design phase were created based on the incremental amounts of projected energy savings from each of the proposed systems and efficiency measures which, according to the energy modelers interviewed for the study, did not account for the building’s performance in its entirety once those systems were installed and operational;

• By nature, predictive energy modeling does not account for the behavior of building operators and occupants with respect to their use of plug loads, occupancy levels, and operating hours (but note the importance of green leasing practices in this context);

• Design and materials changes during the construction phase on account of budget constraints (which emphasizes the need for ongoing construction counsel); and

• Some of the buildings suffered from increased energy consumption during the initial months of occupancy due to incompletely installed or commissioned systems, which the study concluded stemmed from contractors who incorrectly set the systems initially, as well as occupants who did not understand how to use the systems.

In addition to suggesting that these specific design and construction factors may impact green building performance, I think it is also important to note that the authors identified a “frustration” in stakeholders over the observed energy performance gulf. The study suggests that the gap be bridged through “communicating uncertainties in design predictions” and “better training in the use of the technologies in the buildings;” the former is a marketing and construction contracts issue which we’ve frequently discussed in the context of LEED, while the latter can be addressed through the use of various types of green lease provisions.

Although the study itself is somewhat dated, I do think that it emphasizes two important points. First, LEED building performance has been a question mark for quite some time, and will likely remain a critical issue for the foreseeable future, particularly while industry stakeholders continue to grapple with addressing the foregoing building performance factors through risk management strategies, construction contracts, and green lease provisions. Second, it confirms the unpredictable nature of energy modeling and importance for project teams to manage their clients’ expectations when discussing the opportunities presented by green building and other sustainable construction practices.

• Barrientos, J., U. Bhattacharjee, T. Martinez, and J. Duffy, 2007, “Green Buildings in Massachusetts: Comparison between Actual and Predicted Energy Performance,” Proceedings Annual Meeting American Solar Energy Society

If you recall the comments from NAIOP President Thomas Bisacquino in the aftermath of the uproar created by the NAIOP study, Waxman-Markey may ultimately create the precise scenario that NAIOP and its constituents feared: 30 to 50 percent reductions over ASHRAE 90.1-2004 in the short-term. As you may remember, Mr. Bisacquino stated that “to mandate these targets right now, of 30 percent efficiency by 2010, is unrealistic for a lot of properties.” (Note that, even if the bill passes, it will likely not impose the first round of reductions until 2011 or 2012). In the study, NAIOP also argued in favor of increasing available incentives at the local, state, and federal levels to create more palatable payback periods for commercial owners and operators. Accordingly, it will be interesting to see if NAIOP pushes DOE to relax the Section 201 requirements if Waxman-Markey makes it through the Senate, or if this particular section of the bill generates any additional commentary from NAIOP or Mr. Bisacquino. Regardless, it’s clear that building performance- and associated liability concerns- will become increasingly critical issues moving forward if every building in the country is required to meet these new national energy efficient building codes.

• Energy and Climate Bill Would Set National Energy Codes (Worldchanging)
• American Clean Energy and Security Act (Section 201 available at Page 214)

For example, at his presentation at last year’s Greenbuild in Boston, Alan Whitson proposed language whereby a landlord “shall operate and maintain the Building and the Premises to minimize (i) direct and indirect energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions; (ii) water consumption; (iii) the amount of material entering the waste stream; (iv) negative impacts upon the indoor air quality of the Building and the Premises.” As we’ve done previously here at GRELJ with respect to construction agreements, let’s assume for a moment that the Building- perhaps through no fault of the landlord- does not perform at the level suggested by this form language. Is the landlord at risk for a claim by the tenant that it breached this roadmap provision, which will likely sit in a very conspicuous location at the very front of the lease, by failing to “operate and maintain” the building as required by the lease? Perhaps. I think that the point here is, once again, that form language in green leases can be just as dangerous as form language in construction agreements, and both landlords and tenants should guide themselves in the green lease context accordingly. We’ll have much more to say on specific green lease provisions as we continue to move forward through our Green Leasing Series here at GRELJ.

Just as an interesting side note, the BOMA Model Green Lease does not include any similar environmental performance objective language in either the preamble to the lease or in the body of the lease itself.

First, I think that Ms. Shapiro’s last point is probably the biggest reason why we have yet to see a flurry of lawsuits. In my experience, plaintiffs will typically wait until they are up against the controlling statute of limitations before commencing a lawsuit. Here in New York, the applicable statutes of limitation for many of the causes of action under which green building liability may arise (such as negligence and breach of contract) range from three to six years. When you consider that LEED Version 2.2 only went live on January 1, 2006, many of the LEED-related green building claims that have been suggested to date remain well within the statute. This could be a significant reason why both LEED- and green building-related litigation will remain on the horizon for the near future. It is also important to consider that almost every construction agreement contains a confidentiality provision, which prevents the project team from disclosing any information about the project to certain third-parties. If aspects of an ongoing green building project’s design or construction are problematic, we will likely not hear about those failures until (a) the owner chooses to divulge that information; or (b) a lawsuit is commenced (subject to the foregoing SOL considerations).

Next, consider the following text describing the posture of the Shaw Development litigation from footnote 24 of the highly touted Harvard Law School green building liability study that was released last week: “[h]owever, a certificate of occupancy, which was necessary to obtain LEED certification, was not achieved within the requisite amount of time, and the developer failed to earn the tax credits.” (emphasis added). Moreover, in an article in the New York Times‘ Green, Inc. blog discussing the study, Robert Fox, a partner in the Philadelphia-based law firm that sponsored the study was quoted as stating that “the first lawsuit related to LEED, a green-building certification standard, occurred in Maryland, where a new condominium failed to get LEED certification and a certificate of occupancy in time to get substantial tax credits associated with green building.” These descriptions are simply not accurate. As discussed extensively here at GRELJ and over at gbNYC, LEED certification itself was not the source of liability in the Shaw Development litigation. Notwithstanding its pedigree and publicity, the Harvard study is an excellent example of attorneys misconstruing facts and, perhaps, creating heightened expectations that we will imminently see a crush of LEED-related litigation. There is no question that LEED and other third-party green building rating systems create an additional layer of risk that every project team must assess and mitigate through carefully drafted construction agreements, and I do believe that there is significant potential for LEED-related litigation. However, I think that the more imminent threat comes from regulatory structures that are, though perhaps well-intentioned, drafted poorly, enacted quickly, and confusing to project teams and their attorneys as was the case in Shaw Development.

Finally, I suspect that much of the activity that might fall within the purview of “green building litigation” will not jump off the page at us. Consider a recent news article in the Bakersfield Californian where a rooftop photovoltaic installation at a local Target caught fire and required officials to evacuate the store. Preliminary conclusions from the fire department indicated that the panels were not installed properly. These types of issues that arise in connection with green building projects- whether they lead to litigation or are otherwise managed through the insurance claims process- are likely to be far more pervasive than the higher profile LEED certification failures that have been discussed extensively to date. Of course, as LEED-driven mandates continue to proliferate, the potential for LEED-related litigation will continue to increase. But, I do think the relatively unspectacular failures similar to the Bakersfield Target fire are where we will find much of the activity in the short term.

• Solar Panel Mishap Sparks Fire at Target (Bakersfield.com)
• The Legal Risks of Building Green (Green, Inc.)
• Green Building Litigation: Whither the Lawsuits? (Greener Buildings)

Green roofs have been a part of building for over a thousand years. The current green building movement has, however, had the greatest impact on the growth of the green roofing industry. A green roof is commonly defined as a roof that consists of vegetation and soil, or a growing medium, planted over a waterproofing membrane. There are two basic types of green roofs: (i) an extensive roof, which has a few inches of soil cover; and (ii) an intensive roof that has two feet or more of soil for a variety of grass, trees, bushes and shrubs. Green roofs are used in a multitude of buildings, including industrial facilities, commercial offices, retail properties and residences. The benefits of a green roof include reduced storm-water runoff, absorption of air pollution, reduced heat island effect, protection of underlying roof material from sunlight, reduced noise, and insulation from extreme temperatures. A green roof can thus be a critical design element for a green building. As more properties across the country are attempting to obtain LEED certification, it is worth noting that a green roof can help a property obtain over a dozen LEED credits, including credits for reduced site disturbance, landscape design that reduces urban heat islands, storm water management, water efficient landscaping, innovative wastewater technologies and innovation in design. The increase in green roofs and the green building movement is also resulting in an increase in liability resulting from errors in the design, installation or maintenance of green roofs. As a result, owners, design professionals and contractors should carefully consider ways to mitigate the potential risks involved with building a green roof.

In order to mitigate liability, the stakeholders in a project that features a green roof should clearly detail their expectations and performance requirements in their contracts. This will require preparing contracts that might not easily fit within standard forms of architect and construction contracts. A clear example of green roof liability was detailed by Frank Musica at the AIA Convention 2007. In that instance, the green roof contractor and structural engineer failed to communicate the specifics of the green roof. The result was water leakage and significant structural damage. This scenario could have been avoided by simple communication. One can easily imagine potential disputes arising from any of these following situations: (i) failure to deliver the energy efficiency levels claimed by the installation of a green roof; (ii) failure to deliver a green roof that results in the claimed number of LEED credits that should be awarded by the USGBC; (iii) mold or other environmental hazards as a result of poor maintenance of a green roof; or (iv) a roof collapse resulting from a green roof that was not properly constructed, installed or maintained. Parties should look to limit unnecessary liability by drafting contracts that clearly detail how the applicable parties will be responsible for each of the above-mentioned items. Although liability for said items is not able to be eliminated, it is important to all stakeholders that it is appropriately detailed in contract form, instead of by a judge or jury.

Green building owners and general contractors should engage experienced green roofing professionals when building a green roof. The green roofing industry has begun to assist in this regard by designating such professionals in a manner similar to that of the USGBC’s LEED Green Associate or Accredited Professional designations. Green Roofs for Healthy Cities has established the Green Roof Professional (“GRP”), which designation was created to distinguish certain individuals that have achieved a specific knowledge level with regard to green roof design, project management, installation and maintenance.  The goal of the designation level is to allow green roofing professionals to differentiate themselves, establish an increased level of professionalism in the green roofing industry and help protect the public health, safety and welfare by the building of better green roofs. I would strongly encourage clients to seek GRPs when working on a green roof in an attempt to mitigate unforeseen liability. It is worth noting, however, that one likely unintended consequence of this accreditation program for GRPs is that they could very well be held too a higher standard of care should any problems occur following the installation, repair or maintenance of a green roof.

Green roofs provide a benefit to the environment, energy efficiency related savings to property owners and tenants and potential credits for owners seeking LEED or other third-party green building certification for their property. The legal risks and potential liabilities of green roofs should, however, be carefully examined, both by companies considering installing a green roof and by green roof professionals themselves before getting involved with any green roofing project.

Geoff White is a Senior Associate in the Commercial Transactions and Real Estate Group at Frost Brown Todd.  He is a LEED Green Associate (LEED GA) and a Fellow of the Institute of Green Professionals (FIGP).  A sizeable portion of his practice is spent advising clients on the legal issues of green building and sustainable development.  He recently co-authored the chapter “Understanding and Mitigating the Legal Risks of Green Building,” in the Aspatore Books Inside The Minds – Negotiating and Structuring Construction Contracts.  Mr. White is licensed to practice law in Kentucky and Ohio.  Contact him at gwhite@fbtlaw.com or (502) 568-0202.

First, in the MPR preamble, the LEED v3 program expressly provides GBCI with the ability to revoke LEED certification “upon gaining knowledge of non-compliance with any applicable MPRs.” It is thus crucial that project teams consider and comply with each MPR, particularly if the project seeks to take advantage of a state- or local-level LEED-driven incentive program that is keyed to the receipt of formal certification. While we have yet to see LEED-certified project have its certification revoked, an interesting question could arise here if a state or local government that had provided a project with an incentive upon certification sough to recoup those incentives if the project was de-certified by GBCI. Even thornier would be the scenario where a project that was required to earn certification under a legislative mandate loses certification. The corresponding liability-related issues would of course flow downstream and impact each member of the project team. MPR 1 actually obligates every LEED-hopeful project to “be designed to comply with all applicable USA federal, state and local environmental laws and regulations in place where the project is located and at the time of design and construction.” Comprehensive legislative surveys and strong contract language emphasizing regulatory compliance will thus be a priority for project teams under the LEED v3 regime.

From a legal perspective, MPR 7 is perhaps the most important to consider: “all certified projects must commit to allow USGBC to access all available actual whole-project energy and water usage data in the future for research purposes.” Moreover, “[t]his commitment must carry forward if the building changes ownership.” For attorneys, it will be an interesting challenge to draft such a covenant that will bind subsequent purchases of real property (or, in the context of LEED-CS and LEED-CI 2009 MPRs, subsequent tenants). For owners and project teams, it will be imperative to recognize that such language must be translated into purchase agreements or leasing documents such that GBCI cannot revoke a project’s LEED certification. More generally, it will be interesting to see if any private owners balk at granting USGBC access to such data, and whether there are any local legal obstacles (in terms of building codes, utility regulations, etc.) that may make it difficult for owners to provide the data as required by LEED v3.

Applicable MPRs are set forth below as printed in the text of the New Construction and Major Renovations rating system. Note that I have also set forth MPR 6 below, which lays out certain timeframes that project teams should remain aware of. I anticipate that there will be much more analysis of these and other provisions in LEED v3 as more project teams become familiar with the terms and scope of the program; please feel free to suggest any additional legal issues that we may have missed in the comments below.

Minimum Program Requirements (“MPRs”) – LEED 2009 – New Construction and Major Renovations

• LEED Version 3 (USGBC)

The paper is essentially divided into five sections: (1) general points about whether risk exists for real estate stakeholders in connection with green building projects; (2) a brief overview of some emerging regulatory concerns; (3) whether increasing concerns about achieving LEED certification are valid; (4) a discussion of new products and technologies as risk concerns; and (5) how knowledge, experience, and contracts can help green building project stakeholders mitigate green building risk. The paper unquestionably provides a good legal primer with respect to each of these issues but injects a tone of commentary into the discussion that unnecessarily trivializes many of the legal issues that the green construction bar continues to grapple with. For example, the paper starts out by stating that “[a]ccording to insurance professionals . . . there have been very few claims reported arising out of sustainable design to date, despite concerns to the contrary. The risks to architects in ‘building green’ are essentially the same as the risks on other projects.” Standard of care and insurance coverage issues, for example, have many design professionals, their insurers, and even owners concerned about the availability of coverage in event of a claim that arises out of disputed green design services. While general principles of construction law will always apply to every project, calling their application in novel contexts to be simply “old bottles” suggests that there is no additional risk for project teams to consider or attorneys to address in contract documents.

One specific point made in the paper that’s also worth noting relates to the factual posture of the Shaw Development case. The paper incorrectly states that Maryland’s green building tax credit program which was at issue in the lawsuit was “limited to qualifying LEED projects and restricted to a set window of time. The project did not have LEED qualification within the window of time and Shaw sued for damages for the loss of the tax credits.” As you’ll recall, the issue in Shaw was the parties’ failure to understand the applicable tax credit program, which required a certificate of occupancy by a certain fixed date in order for a LEED-hopeful project to take advantage of tax credits; formal LEED certification was not required. Shaw emphasizes that legislative schemes are among the fundamental drivers of green building risk and must be clearly understood and accurately reflected by controlling contract documents.

Additionally, on page 5, the paper states that “[w]hile some commentators recommend avoiding guarantees, a precise contract can appropriately define the guarantee and mitigate risk.” However, there is no detailed discussion of exactly how stakeholders might begin to craft such provisions. More critically, the paper fails to discuss why even the appearance of the equivalent of a warranty or a guarantee or an elevated standard of care may be problematic from the perspective of a professional liability policy (i.e., these are form exclusions to the standard policy which most architects and engineers are required to procure on every project by contract). The Marsh end-of-year report from 2008 makes it clear that professional liability insurers are keenly monitoring this area of activity with heightened scrutiny. While standard exclusions to a professional liability policy are indeed traditional components of construction law, it is also clear that the rapidly moving standard of care for design professionals is unprecedented, and its implications should not be understated by attorneys who represent architects and engineers.

I want to emphasize that I am not criticizing USGBC’s effort to foster discussion about these important issues; rather, I think it’s extremely positive that the organization has taken this initial step towards engaging the legal industry in refining the parameters of green building risk management. As I noted last November over at gbNYC, this was a major shortcoming at last year’s Greenbuild and it’s encouraging that USGBC has started to move in a different direction. However, I think it is troubling that the paper chose to characterize green building law as “new wine in old bottles.” In my opinion, the reasons why many of the issues noted in the paper are creating a new paradigm meriting the attention of both legal scholars and practitioners are four-pronged: regulatory activity at the federal, state, and local levels is moving more rapidly than anyone can track in sufficient detail; the insurance coverage implications for claims arising out of green design have been largely unremarked upon; the insurance industry itself has acknowledged that the standard of care for design professionals is changing more quickly than at any time in history thanks to the proliferation of the LEED AP and green design obligations in the new AIA construction documents; and preliminary data suggesting that green buildings may not perform at the higher level generally anticipated by most project teams may have significant consequences both in terms of litigation and future policymaking. These are a set of completely new and emerging legal issues that will have a major impact on how attorneys create risk management strategies for their clients as green construction practices continue to proliferate. Suggesting otherwise will likely damage the long-term prospects of the green building movement, particularly if it encourages stakeholders not to take these emerging risks seriously and engage counsel capable of assisting them in navigating unchartered waters.

The paper is a quick read and I hope you will print it, review it, and share your thoughts in the comments below.

• The Legal Risk in Building Green (USGBC)

The station first interviewed a number of Washington’s larger school districts, who reported their experience to be a green building premium between 3 and 7 percent, not the 2 percent claimed by the state. In the video, a Spokane School District spokesman states that one particular elementary school in Lincoln Heights would save $40,000.00 annually in operating costs. KING 5 followed up by interviewing this same spokesman, who said that this amount was an “incorrect projection” and the school is actually saving around $15,000.00. Finally, the video contends that “[o]ne California district has seen scores increase close to 30 percent in buildings with abundant daylight. While other districts may see increases of lesser magnitude, the conclusion is still the same: better light equals better scores.” KING 5 reports that this claim is “based on just one study done by a California architecture consulting firm ten years ago. WASL scores [that the station] looked at from three local schools did not show any noticeable improvement once the students moved into a new building.” This last point is particularly interesting to note given the weight that many green building advocates accord to the alleged soft benefits of sustainable design (i.e., increased worker productivity, reduced absenteeism, etc.). According to the station, representatives from the state refused to appear on camera with KING 5 to discuss the results of its report.

I think KING 5′s investigation suggests a number of important points that have been discussed previously here at GRELJ, both in prior articles and in the comments. First, as we move forward through this horrible economy, claims about projected green building performance and the benefits associated therewith that are used to buttress support for state- and local-level policymaking will be viewed with heightened scrutiny, particularly where taxpayer dollars may be used to fund such programs. Second, questionable performance issues with respect to green buildings will continue to demand strong contract language for all construction stakeholders, as well as carefully crafted marketing or other materials representing a property’s green design features and projected operating expenses. Finally, if other major media outlets follow KING 5′s lead in terms of investigating green building claims made by public entities in support of legislation, it could go a long way towards disseminating better performance data and, in turn, drive projects to achieve the higher efficiences and lower operating expenses that every industry stakeholder is pushing for.

• Investigators: Green School Claims Oversold (KING 5)

Lest anyone suggest that these not practical concerns for every green construction project, I’ve compiled a series of images below of project sites here in Manhattan at various stages of completion over the course of the past six months. From left to right, I think the images speak for themselves; the first project, though pre-certified at the time under the LEED for Core and Shell system, had not formally received a LEED Gold rating from USGBC as the sidewalk bridging suggested. The second, which is currently plastered over construction fencing that covers future ground floor retail space at what will be a LEED Gold retrofit in Midtown, simply states that the space is “green” without any detail regarding exactly what “green” means. Finally, I think the third photograph demonstrates a partial best practice for green building owners: be straightforward about the project and what is attempting to accomplish – “pursuing LEED Gold certification”- without making exaggerated claims or guarantees about final certification level or how the building will perform down the line.

As Kim Ford of CresaPartners notes in the CoStar piece, “[o]ften, the people marketing LEED-registered buildings like to use the word LEED, but they’re very naive about the terminology.” Anderson also makes the excellent point that “[w]hen it’s a statement of environmental good, there’s a presumption that it might not need to be examined carefully.” Beyond terminology, Mr. Burr points out that, according to a recent study by Green World Media, between 25 and 30 percent of LEED-registered projects drop out of the process and never proceed to final certification, in part due to the expense, but also the average two-year lag between registration and formal certification. For the owner that sticks “LEED Gold Certified” on project marketing materials, in quarterly reports or other disclosures to the SEC, or in a lease term sheet with a tenant who has a corporate mandate to occupy office space in LEED Gold buildings only, the potential liability for a LEED-registered project that drops out of USGBC’s queue could be enormous.

One of the major reasons why I launched this site was to foster a “more robust,” as I called it, discussion of the liability aspects of building green amongst industry stakeholders and, again, I’m happy to see CoStar presenting some of these issues so early on in 2009. Nevertheless, I do think these issues are real and serious for every owner to consider, particularly in the type of down economy where litigation is always more pervasive.

• Increase in Dubious Claims of LEED Certification Seen in Marketplace (CoStar)

What happens if the ultimate rating that is conferred by USGBC is not Gold but Silver? It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where a tenant sues everyone in the chain- the owner, design professionals, consultants, contractors, and even lenders- if the project fails to reach the level of certification that was advertised. Significantly, we have already heard of claims where tenants sued owners when office space did not perform at the level that the tenant anticipated with respect to indoor air quality and energy efficiency. Owners must therefore be careful about elevating the expectations of potential tenants with respect to a building’s puported green features by accurately presenting a project’s sustainable elements in promotional materials. This obligation should, of course, extend to the project’s construction documents, which should clearly reflect the green design services for which the parties are contracting. Transactional risk management in advance of construction will assist stakeholders in mitigating risk and ensuring that the project achieves specific, targeted measures of green performance- whether it be under a third-party rating system or some other objective as defined by the parties in their contract.