Article 1 of the Exhibit – Project Goals – allows the parties to describe the project’s green building aims with specificity and align their expectations from the beginning; as many insurers have observed, “claims begin with violated expectations.” Article 5 addresses some of the insurance claims which have been reported to date, and includes language that aims to manage the risks that may arise from the use of experimental products, designs, or building systems. (Note that “aggressive design” was one specific risk identified by Marsh in its report last summer about green building-related risks perceived by A/E/C executives).

However, Article 4 – Remedies, is the provision which I think deserves the most attention. It offers the owner and its design-builder a menu of options to choose in the event that the project fails to earn the anticipated level of LEED or other third-party certification, or other green building project goal that may be described elsewhere in the Exhibit. Critically, though, the obligation for determining whether any green building regulatory requirements exist with which the project must comply rests not with the design-builder, but with the owner. More on that in a moment.

With respect to how potential remedies are organized in Article 4, the owner can first expressly agree that a failure is not a breach of contract, and simply waive any claims against the design-builder arising out of the project’s failure “to satisfy or achieve LEED certification at any level or other sustainable standards.” If the owner’s green goals for the project are purely aspirational, this may be a viable request for the design-builder or contractor to make during negotiations. Of course, if third-party or other certification is required by code or other legislation, such a provision will likely be unacceptable to the owner.

Alternatively, the parties can agree to a fixed dollar amount as liquidated damages in the event of a failure. In this provision, the owner also provides the design-builder with a waiver of claims for other related damages, including consequential damages. As we have discussed here at GRELJ previously, this may be problematic for a variety of reasons. From a legal perspective, whether a liquidated damages provision in this context would be considered a penalty rather than a legitimate estimate of the damages the owner would stand to incur is still a question mark. It will likely be a significant period of time before we have a court opinion weighing on this critical issue.

Finally, the Exhibit includes what I believe to be the most interesting approach to allocating risk in Section 4.3. There, the parties can choose to impose a limited obligation to cure the project’s failure on the design-builder. This obligation is “to cure the situation through the addition, replacement or correction of materials, configurations, systems or equipments in order to obtain the level of LEED certification indicated above and/or to satisfy or achieve other sustainable standards as are identified, or as required by the Legal Requirements [defined in Article 3 of the Exhibit].”

However, the extent of the curing costs for which the design-builder will be responsible is limited to: (i) any remaining funds in the construction contingency (typically a percentage of the overall cost of the work that exists to cover unanticipated construction expenses, which requires the builder to obtain the owner’s prior written approval before accessing it); (ii) the design-builder’s share in the savings if the cost of the work comes in less than the design-builder’s guaranteed maximum price of the work; or (iii) a fixed sum agreed to by the parties.

What is also important to note about the Exhibit is that it places the obligation for determining the Legal Requirements (again, as defined in Article 3) squarely on the shoulders of the owner. In other words, the party which is generally in the least adequate position to determine what those legal requirements might be is actually responsible for them by contract. This makes little sense, and I cannot imagine an owner agreeing to carry that burden, particularly in the current regulatory climate which is changing so rapidly and varies so widely depending on the particular jurisdiction. It seems like an odd approach, and I am curious if anyone has any insight or feedback as to why DBIA crafted Article 3 in this manner.

The entire Exhibit is certainly worth reviewing in detail, but one other provision that I want to draw your particular attention to is Section 6.2, which states clearly that “[i]n no event shall the dates of Substantial Completion and Final Completion be contingent on any certification of the Project to meet any level of the USGBC’s LEED rating system or other similar system.” This is critical, particularly where project schedules are tight and other penalties – liquidated or otherwise – may begin accruing if substantial completion is not reached as required.

One other final thought – it’s also interesting to me that the first green building contract addendum – the AIA’s B214-2004 – purely addressed scope when it debuted three years ago. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations with form contracts and exhibits, and the fact that scope documents such as the B214 do remain useful tools for project teams, the industry clearly perceives risks arising out of green building projects. I anticipate that we will see more organizations developing and promoting similar consensus documents with risk management provisions as we continue to move forward in 2010.

The Addendum also creates a new role for design professionals, contractors, or consultants: the Green Building Facilitator, responsible under the terms of the Addendum for coordinating and facilitating the process of obtaining the owner’s desired green building status or certification, identifying green building measures (both procedural and physical), potential design and construction alternatives, and other services as required by the terms of the Addendum. The Green Building Facilitator is identified explicitly in Section 4 of the Addendum and can be the architect, engineer, contractor, or other corporate entity (or individual). However, the Addendum places certain risks on the Facilitator, and parties that choose to accept this role pursuant to the Addendum should review its terms and conditions carefully.

What’s most interesting for purposes of this article, though, is that Article 8 of the Addendum is devoted exclusively to risk allocation. Article 8.2 provides that the parties- including the Green Building Facilitator- will be subject to any limitations on liability that are included in their underlying contracts. However, this provision explicitly acknowledges that the owner’s “loss of income or profit or inability to realize potential reductions in operating, maintenance, or other related costs, tax, or other similar benefits or credits, marketing opportunities and other similar opportunities or benefits, resulting from a failure to attain the [project’s green building goals as defined in the Addendum] shall be deemed consequential damages subject to any applicable waiver of consequential damages” in any underlying design or construction contract. Compare this provision to the discussion which arose out of the Shaw Development litigation, where many commentators wondered what types of damages flowing from the breach of a green building contract would be deemed consequential in nature rather than direct. It’s therefore particularly noteworthy that the Addendum (i) acknowledges the types of unique damages that may flow from the breach of a green construction contract; and (ii) actually makes an initial effort at defining them. Of course, parties are free to negotiate the terms of the Addendum, including (depending on the project’s scope) (i) the types of damages which would be included in the provision; and (ii) any waivers – mutual or otherwise – in the underlying agreement. In Shaw, as you will recall, the issue was whether the lost tax credits were consequential and therefore waived by the owner through the A201’s mutual waiver provision; under the form terms of the Addendum, they would have been explicitly categorized as consequential. Had the parties in Shaw implemented a document like the Addendum, it would have assisted them in more comprehensively assessing the green building-related risk associated with the project and allocating that risk accordingly.

The Addendum also makes it clear that no project participant other than the Green Building Facilitator will be “liable or responsible for the failure of [any procedural or physical green measures] to achieve the [project’s green building goals as defined in the Addendum],” including the project’s failure to earn any third-party certification as designated in the Addendum. However, the Addendum also makes clear that these limitations on the project team’s liability do not relieve them “from any obligation to perform or provide [procedural or physical green measures]” as required by their underlying contracts. It will be interesting to see if additional form green building contracts and/or addenda are issued in 2010, whether they take these types of risks and limitations on liability into account, and, if so, in what particular fashion.

As you may know, ConsensusDOCS was founded in 2007 and, to date, its suite of form design and construction agreements has been endorsed by 23 different A/E/C organizations. You can download a copy of the Addendum via the link below. As always, the Arent Fox Green Building & Sustainability and Construction Practice Groups are happy to assist you with any additional questions you might have about either the Addendum or working with construction contracts generally.

• 310 Green Building Addendum (ConsensusDOCS)
• New Document Defines Role in Green Building Projects (Arch. Record)

The USGBC August 25, 2009 press release about their Building Performance Initiative implies that a large-scale collection of energy data from LEED® buildings will improve energy performance. This suggests a response to escalating criticism about the actual energy use of LEED® certified buildings compared with all others. Why do few published stories about these buildings include metered energy and water use data? If these buildings can waste energy efficiently, perhaps one answer is not to include those measures that allow that to happen.

The reality is that neither predicted nor actual measured energy use determines whether a building is energy efficient. Nor does energy use alone determine whether a building meets or exceeds all required or desired criteria, or provide the accountability necessary to achieve those results.

I have been collecting and evaluating detailed metered and measured building energy performance data for 40 years. Collecting the data is one thing, even if done completely and correctly. However, evaluating the data and then making comparisons among buildings is something else. Buildings alone do not use energy. The occupants, operators, and systems do.

In an extreme case, look at apartment buildings where each apartment is identical, and the metered energy use per apartment can easily vary by 2 or 3 to one, or more. Individually metered floors in office buildings occupied by the same company or tenant also can vary by 2 or 3 to one.

The functions in a building can also have a major influence on building energy use. The presence of a laundry in a hotel or hospital can make a 25 to 50% difference in total building energy use per bed, room, or square foot compared with an identical building on the same street.

Buildings with intermittent occupancy present similar dilemmas. How does one estimate, predict, or compare the energy data for two identical churches on the same block built at the same time, when one is only occupied for a few hours each Sunday and on some holidays, and the other is occupied most days of the week?

Comparing metered energy use to modeled energy data is not a valid measurement of anything. If the modeling and estimating methods were sufficiently accurate, utility companies would not require the use of meters.

Some articles I wrote 25 years ago show apartment by apartment or office floor by office floor metered energy use data in the same building. For another good example, look at the range of energy data for any given building type shown in the statistically significant quadrennial CBECS reports, collected at a cost in eight figures.

That reminds me of an energy research project 35 years ago during the 1970’s energy crisis. The US Postal Service spent hundreds of thousand of dollars instrumenting and recording the detailed energy use in a large postal facility. The conclusion was that they could collect lots of data.

The answer in evaluating and comparing energy data is using professional judgment and experience. That involves knowing and understanding not only the energy use and particulars of the subject building, but also the energy use and particulars of comparable buildings in the area. Comparing the energy use of a suburban office building in Boston with suburban office buildings in Providence without knowing the particulars is not likely to be meaningful or conclusive. This is much like the commercial real estate appraisal profession.

I think that there are a few important things to consider here. First, in USGBC’s Building Performance Initiative press release, LEED Senior Vice President Scot Horst notes that “[p]lenty of people are content to simply point to these longstanding issues [relating to LEED building performance] without offering a constructive way to address them. We’re going to take them on and engage practitioners and thought leaders alike in establishing a national roadmap to optimize building performance.”

After last fall’s Greenbuild, I suggested over at gbNYC that, if USGBC was serious about improving the energy performance of LEED buildings, it needed to engage building scientists such as Henry Gifford, Joseph Lstiburek, and Mr. Spielvogel in a meaningful way- certainly through more of an effort than simply collecting more data. As Mr. Spielvogel notes in his letter above, “[b]uildings alone do not use energy. The occupants, operators, and systems do.” This, of course, is what makes the type of predictive energy modeling on which LEED relies so imprecise and why project teams need to remain careful about the types of representations they make to their clients about the performance-related results of potential LEED certification. As Pat Murphy noted in a recent comment here at GRELJ, “[t]here is a crying need for accurate, verifiable and reliable energy rating systems. If LEED doesn’t fill the bill, other options will come forward.” I agree with Mr. Murphy and, in conclusion, would suggest that this is precisely what should give policymakers pause as they consider incorporating LEED- as currently constituted- into state- or local-level green building legislation.

• The Ugly, the Bad, & the Good: Thoughts on Greenbuild 2008 (gbNYC)
• Some Buildings Not Living Up to Green Label (NYT)
• Building Performance Initiative (USGBC Press Release)

Green building design, construction and operation practices have gained widespread popularity in the healthcare industry in recent years, even considering the current challenging economic climate. This trend is likely to continue because green building practices result in both decreased overall life cycle costs and healthier building occupants. This article will briefly examine the background of building green in the healthcare sector, discuss the unique needs of healthcare facilities in relation to green building practices, and finally examine the choices and challenges faced by healthcare facilities in determining whether to design, construct and/or operate a green building facility, with a specific emphasis on the legal issues therein.

Introduction

According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), green building is the practice of creating healthier and more resource-efficient models of construction, renovation, operation, maintenance and demolition. The leading vehicles for green building implementation in the healthcare industry are the Green Guide for Healthcare (“GGHC”), a healthcare industry driven system that was created by the American Society for Healthcare Engineering in 2002 and the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) rating system administered by the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC).

Adapting Green Building to the Unique Needs of Healthcare Facilities

There are a number of unique challenges in accomplishing standard green building practices in healthcare facilities, including, among others:

• The need for hospitals and other healthcare facilities to be open with all systems functioning 24/7;
• The high level of dangerous waste produced by healthcare facilities;
• Patients’ increased sensitivities to chemicals and pollutants (along with related air circulation issues);
• The need for healthcare facilities to meet stringent regulatory standards which are not applicable to typical commercial developments; and
• The fact that healthcare facilities have different transportation expectations than some other places of business (e.g. very few patients can be expected to ride bicycles to the hospital).

As a result of these differences, green building standards for the healthcare industry have taken longer to develop than other uses. Until recently, the healthcare industry generally relied on GGHC in designing, constructing and operating a green building. The GGHC is a voluntary self-certifying program that borrows from, but is not formally connected to the LEED rating system. In a manner similar to the LEED system, GGHC gives a certain number of “credits” for each environmentally-friendly and energy-efficient characteristic incorporated into a building. GGHC includes metrics for both construction and operations, which allows it to be used for existing facilities as well as new construction. Because GGHC is a self-certifying system, healthcare entities who wish to use it must vouch for their own compliance with the program.

The USGBC’s LEED system is the most established green building rating system. It is also a third-party certification system, so in contrast to GGHC, it more rigorously scrutinizes a project’s green building features. Some healthcare facilities have elected to invest the extra time, money, and effort required for LEED certification. For example, the Dell Children’s Medical Center (“DCMC”) in Austin, Texas is one of the most dynamic green building healthcare facilities, as evidenced by recently becoming the world’s first LEED Platinum-certified hospital. DCMC has succeeded in accomplishing some amazing results, including, an onsite natural gas power plant providing 100% of the facility’s electricity; recycling 75% of the waste produced during construction; and ensuring that no location in the building is ever more than 32 feet away from a source of sunlight. Various challenges, such as the hospital’s 24/7 operation schedule, required DCMC to overcompensate in other areas in order to reach Platinum certification. The project’s architect admits that the challenges in obtaining certification under a system not designed for healthcare were “enormous,” but apparently worth the cost for the hospital, which predicts that its energy efficiency investments will pay for themselves within six years. There are currently less than 40 other LEED-certified healthcare facilities of any type across the country (including, for example, the
Boulder Community Hospital in Boulder, Colorado, which was the first-ever hospital to be LEED-certified, and the Jewish Hospital Medical Center South in the Louisville, Kentucky area). However, approximately 350 hospitals that are currently under construction are LEED-registered, indicating a desire to achieve LEED certification upon completion. Luckily, for those looking for something more rigorous than the GGHC, but more tailored to healthcare than general LEED certification, the USGBC will soon issue a new LEED for Healthcarerating system. The new certification system will incorporate feedback from pilot projects that used GGHC and will be open to a public comment period before being officially implemented.

Choices and Challenges

Those who are beginning the planning process for green healthcare facilities have three possible paths to choose from at this point: they can wait until LEED for Healthcare is rolled out, use traditional LEED, or use GGHC. All of these choices have positives and negatives: LEED for Healthcare will likely become the new industry standard, but its exact requirements are not yet clear, so healthcare entities might have to delay their projects or could be taking a risk by committing themselves to a program under which they may not be able to obtain certification. Traditional LEED is rigorous and well-recognized, but could impose unnecessary costs and difficulties when applied to the healthcare sector. GGHC has clear metrics that are already tailored to healthcare construction and operations, but does not carry the same weight as LEED since it is a voluntary, self-certifying system.

There are certain actions, no matter what green building rating system decision makers elect to utilize, that healthcare facility decision makers must take in order to limit unforeseen cost, risk and liability. It is important to make green building goals clear and specific early in the planning process. A team of experienced professionals, including architects, construction managers, contractors, lawyers and others, with quantifiable experience on past GGHC or LEED-certified projects is also highly recommended. These experts will be able to properly guide property owners with the unique issues that arise in connection with green building and thus help mitigate further risk.

There are multiple legal risks that green healthcare facility project teams should consider, some of which may include:

• Whether there any potential governmental incentives or other awards that might help supplement the costs of green construction;
• The proper detailing of liability for failure to achieve certain green standards;
• The evolution of labor laws regarding the classification of the construction tasks for new green building work, such as green roofs;
• Lease drafting that requires all tenants at the property satisfy certain green building operational requirements; and
• Avoidance of greenwashing, or misleading the environmental benefits of the facility or services being provided.

There are innumerable other legal issues associated with green building and leasing. As this is an emerging area, it is important to work with professionals in order to avoid unnecessary liabilities when implementing green design features or pursuing any form of third-party certification.

Conclusion

Green building design, construction and operation practices are likely to continue at an exponential growth pattern in the healthcare industry in the years ahead. It is critical for facility owners, managers and stakeholders to fully understand the unique issues that arise for green building in the healthcare arena and work with a team of professionals that can help advise and minimize the risks associated therewith.

Toronto’s mandate is interesting to consider in light of the risks that we have pointed out previously both here at GRELJ and over at gbNYC with respect to green roofs generally. For example, last fall, we noted an article in Property Week magazine that discussed insurer attitudes towards the increased installation of green roofs in the United Kingdom. Many insurers believe that green roofs are likely to become flammable and have identified schools- and their relatively easy low-rise roof access- as particularly troublesome from the perspective of potential arson. Property Week also cited a 2006 report authored by Zurich’s Stuart Blackie which stated that ““[t]his concept of construction is often sold on its environmental benefits. The issue of fire spread, combustibility and indeed fire safety are often overlooked.” Toronto also appears to have ignored some evidence that suggests those environmental benefits may have been oversold. For example, the Canadian National Research Council had previously reported to the city that the energy savings from green roofs would only occur for 3 months during the year and that any claimed water retention benefits simply did not exist. It will be instructive in the coming months to see the reactions- if any- from the property insurance market to the new legislation, or if Toronto’s development community will muster any sort of additional challenge to its implementation.

I think the Toronto mandate is important to consider in the context of other green building policies that have been enacted here in the United States quickly without sufficient analysis. The fact that the Toronto legislation was passed without any real debate- despite significant evidence that its perceived benefits might be less than suggested- suggests the same type of policymaking that here in the United States has already become problematic in litigations such as AHRI v. City of Albuquerque. If policies are implemented poorly, green building goals are not advanced when litigation ensues, either to challenge such policies or as their direct byproduct. I also think it’s clear that this type of green building legislation will continue to be enacted in municipalities of all shapes and sizes regardless of the practical implications for private real estate. Accordingly, it will remain increasingly critical that industry stakeholders monitor such activity in their localities such that they can work with counsel to formulate sufficient risk management strategies that address those emerging implications.

• Toronto Adopts Mandatory Green Roof Requirements (PR)
• Toronto Mulls Mandatory Green Roofs (Green, Inc.)
• Green Roofs a Hidden Risk? (gbNYC)

As you will recall, NAIOP analyzed and then assembled a package of energy efficiency features that it identified based on a targeted 10-year payback period and then modeled the building in three separate climate zones to come up with its projected energy reductions over ASHRAE 90.1-2004. The study concluded by stating that the projected energy efficiency savings were “done primarily by upgrading the building envelope insulation and increasing efficiency of energy using sub-systems. Representing the practical limit of current construction, together, these upgrades will save enough energy in approximately 10 years to offset their marginal increase in cost. Solar can be used to make up the difference to 30 percent, but with a payback timeframe exceeding 50 years.”

NAIOP concluded that to reach the target reductions, an 11,000-square-foot rooftop photovoltaic system would be required at an installed cost of approximately $1.1 million; such a payback period would be in the range of 55 to 100 years. Interestingly, the report itself notes that “[a]fter upgrading building energy features, solar generation is the current solution for additional energy savings over the 90.1-2004 Standard. However, installed solar cost would need to come down by a factor of five for it to meet the ten-year payback criteria. This presents a significant economic barrier. Federal, state, and local incentives can further reduce this barrier.”

For policymakers, I believe that the study- and NAIOP’s response, particularly with respect to this latter point- is critical to consider, particularly in the context of crafting green building legislation in the form of a mandate rather than incentive. I think that it is critical for policymakers to understand that the the purpose of the study was to determine whether some of the 30 to 50 percent reductions in efficiency that are being discussed in many legislatures is practicable given current technologies and standard development practices. Absent significant financial incentives for developers that will bring expected payback periods in line with their business models, the types of efficiencies that we are hearing about are not economically feasible given current technologies. NAIOP’s FAQ actually notes that “a 10-year payback period is an extreme case for a developer to use as a business model” and many of NAIOP’s members have actually told it “that they cannot include anything beyond a 5-year payback in their business model.”

NAIOP President Thomas Bisacquino responded to critics in an interview he gave last month to GlobeSt.com with a number of interesting quotations that I have pulled and set forth below for your reference:

• “The reaction to the study has been really blown out of proportion. It’s clearly a case of shooting the messenger for the message. I’m not saying the study is perfect. I’m sure there are technical flaws. But it generally gives you a sense that to mandate these targets right now, of 30 percent efficiency by 2010, is unrealistic for a lot of properties.”
• “If these efficiency goals were set 3, 4, 5 years out, it would be a different story. A lot of these goals are here and now, the next 10 to 12 months. That’s where we see an issue.”
• “We think it’s very positive that if you use standard design, you can reach upwards of 23 percent without building a green building.”
• “I’ve read that you can use a lot of these technologies like solar to get a much quicker payback than our study indicates. They’re right, but where they’re suggesting that is where there are incentives at the city level, the county level, the state level. That’s what we’re advocating. We think incentives are good things. We don’t want mandates. We want incentives.”
• “The bottom line is that we’re an industry that does make a profit, with investors who have to be satisfied. They have to look at the operations of the building. Profit is not a bad thing. That’s how these companies work.”
• “We felt there were feel-good numbers being picked out of the air, [with some] saying ‘we need to mandate or legislate these targets through building code.’ They weren’t goals, or even nice targets to hit. They were going to become law. We asked, ‘is there data out there that supports these goals as something we can achieve and keep the building profitable. That’s the key.’”

Perhaps most interestingly, Mr. Bisacquino closed his interview with GlobeSt.com by noting that NAIOP is considering a variety of other building types for its next study, including a high-rise commercial office building or industrial property.

Just as a final note, while NAIOP acknowledges that much higher efficiencies are possible for trophy buildings or other types of development, I think that that the study helps buttress the argument that one-size-fits-all mandates will not make sense until a sufficient body of performance data emerges from an adequate cross-section of building stock.

• NAIOP Study – Facts
• NAIOP Study – FAQ
• Thomas Bisacquino Interview (GlobeSt.com)

Lest anyone suggest that these not practical concerns for every green construction project, I’ve compiled a series of images below of project sites here in Manhattan at various stages of completion over the course of the past six months. From left to right, I think the images speak for themselves; the first project, though pre-certified at the time under the LEED for Core and Shell system, had not formally received a LEED Gold rating from USGBC as the sidewalk bridging suggested. The second, which is currently plastered over construction fencing that covers future ground floor retail space at what will be a LEED Gold retrofit in Midtown, simply states that the space is “green” without any detail regarding exactly what “green” means. Finally, I think the third photograph demonstrates a partial best practice for green building owners: be straightforward about the project and what is attempting to accomplish – “pursuing LEED Gold certification”- without making exaggerated claims or guarantees about final certification level or how the building will perform down the line.

As Kim Ford of CresaPartners notes in the CoStar piece, “[o]ften, the people marketing LEED-registered buildings like to use the word LEED, but they’re very naive about the terminology.” Anderson also makes the excellent point that “[w]hen it’s a statement of environmental good, there’s a presumption that it might not need to be examined carefully.” Beyond terminology, Mr. Burr points out that, according to a recent study by Green World Media, between 25 and 30 percent of LEED-registered projects drop out of the process and never proceed to final certification, in part due to the expense, but also the average two-year lag between registration and formal certification. For the owner that sticks “LEED Gold Certified” on project marketing materials, in quarterly reports or other disclosures to the SEC, or in a lease term sheet with a tenant who has a corporate mandate to occupy office space in LEED Gold buildings only, the potential liability for a LEED-registered project that drops out of USGBC’s queue could be enormous.

One of the major reasons why I launched this site was to foster a “more robust,” as I called it, discussion of the liability aspects of building green amongst industry stakeholders and, again, I’m happy to see CoStar presenting some of these issues so early on in 2009. Nevertheless, I do think these issues are real and serious for every owner to consider, particularly in the type of down economy where litigation is always more pervasive.

• Increase in Dubious Claims of LEED Certification Seen in Marketplace (CoStar)

• Top 5 Legal Issues to Consider on Green Construction Projects (gbNYC)
• Green Building Liability (gbNYC category)
• Contract Language Remains Key (gbNYC)
• Need for Green Counsel as Claims Brought Against Designers (gbNYC)

• West Coast Green Panel Discusses Risk Management for Green Building Projects (gbNYC)
• Minimizing Green Building Risks (Greener Buildings)
• Listening to Greenbuild (Green Building Law Blog)

• Green Roofs a Hidden Risk for Insurers (gbNYC)